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SEEING ATROCITY

currence at the time. "That was what life in a concentration camp had made of
me": just what is the that of the statement?
Half a dozen pages later, Wiesel describes an air raid on the camp during
which a prisoner, apparently half crazed, throws himself toward a cauldron of
piping hot soup, an act that leads to his being shot and killed . After the raid,
Wiesel writes, "In the very center of the camp lay the body of the man with
soup stains on his face, the only victim. The cauldrons were carried back to the
kitchen" (60-61) . The body left to lie in the middle of tl1e camp, like the memory of the kindness of the French wom an and their meeting years later, seems
to function as an image that stands in and substitutes for what happened and for
that which can't be told as a story. These episodes, incongruous with the
scheme of the narrative-with its chronological march through the year during
which Wiesel and his father lived through the hell of Auschwitz and the death
march to Buchenwald-are a sign, like the imperfection in the fabric of testimony, of something that may not be available to memory, or to language, at all.
In fact, one could argue that it is this point-about what happens to language
and to knowledge in the face of the horrifying event-that Night makes most
directly. The book seems to work against the bilderverbot , the injunction
against idolatry, because it insists that, while the event may not be available to
memory or language, memory and language are all we have . It's no coincidence
that the book is punctuated by explicit references to the failure of language and
narrative in the face of events: from the story Wiesel's father does not finish
early in the book (because he is called to a meeting of tl1e Jewish council just
before Sighet's ghetto is liquidated ) to Mrs. Schachter's failure to make those in
the boxcar on its way to Auschwitz see the fire tl1at only she can see (until they
reach the camp and see it themselves), the book isn't a testimony or a memoir
so much as it is a document that shows the limits of language and memory
when confronted by events . Or, more precisely, Night makes clear what happens when one substitutes images, language, and 'memories of the ready-athand for what is impossible to recall or to relate to others.
Through the inevitable failure of his stories-it's through his inability to testify to what he saw and through the marks this horror leaves on his writing in
the form of hesitations, failures of seeing, incongruities, and the disbelief wiili
which the witness seems to describe even those things he saw-Wiesel most
clearly succeeds not in witnessing himself but in providing an instrument for
his readers to witness. Though we and our students may not see the horrors
Wiesel saw, we are able to glimpse the limits of witnessing and how language
botl1 does and doesn't represent the atrocity of the Shoah.

NOTE
The epigraph is from page 98 of Night .

COURSES AND CLASSROOM STRATEGIES

Night and Critical Thinking
Paul Eisenstein
For several years now, I have been teaching Night in a junior-level composition
and literature course, The Dilemma of Human Existence. Required of all students, this course is a staple of our core curriculum and is charged primarily
with the task of improving communication and critical thinking skills. As at
many liberal arts colleges, such a course is structured on a kind of"great books"
model and tlms involves readings ranging from antiquity to the present. The
pedagogical direction pursued by such courses, however, is not primarily historicist-not only because tl1ere is not the time to contextualize works with any
rigor, but also because the course has a bigger fish to hook. I refer here to those
students majoring in fields outside the humanities who are more likely to see
the significance and vitality of literature for their own lives and value systems
when every work is treated as if it were their contemporary. Those of us entrusted with a course of ilie kind I am talking about, then, teach particular literary works not so much for how they reflect or participate in the discourse of
their day as for the way they stage for our students difficult encounters with
their own ideas or beliefs. In my course, in the attempt to catalyze a critical dialogue about divine justice and our memorial obligations to the dead, I begin
usually witl1 Sophocles's Oedipus plays, Dante's Inferno , and then Shakespeare's Hamlet. These texts present characters who struggle with the unfairness of the world, the justness of theodicy, and the problem of doing right by
the dead-matters that Night so powerfully and forcefully foregrounds.
I think it is fair to say, however, that Wiesel's memoir takes the opportunity
for-and practice of-critical thinking a step beyond the level that writers of
tragedies like Sophocles, Dante, and Shakespeare get us to inhabit. The tragic
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story told in Night differs in significant ways. First, Sophocles, Dante, and
Shakespeare invite us, to greater or lesser degrees, to regard the suffering they
present as warranted-caused or prolonged either by tragic character flaws or
manifestly sinful conduct. Second, Sophocles, Dante, and Shakespeare dramatize a suffering that is, for their protagonists (and audiences), unmistakably ennobling-part of some meaningfully cathartic, divinely inspired, pedagogical
design. The fate Sophocles gives his tragic hero in Oedipus the King does, in
the end, ratify the integrity of oracular knowledge (a fact noted by the play's
chorus), and in Oedipus at Colonus, an aged Oedipus is granted a sanctuary and
a miraculous death. Dante is repeatedly moved to remark on the moral lesson
his journey through hell is designed to teach him, and it is, after all, a journey
that will eventually take him to heaven and his angelic beloved Beatrice. Shakespeare does, by play's end, affirm a providential heroism in his hero's conduct.
Finally, the stories of Oedipus, Dante, and Hamlet include scenes in which suffering or death is recognized and memorialized by a wider public. These are
scenes in which it appears that certain obligations to the casualties of violence
are being met: tl1e place of Oedipus's death is designated sacred by the gods
and protected as such by the Athenian king, Theseus; Dante consistently asks
the sinners he meets for their stories so tl1at, as he says at one point, "your
memory I In men's minds in tl1e former world won't fade I But live on under
many suns" (29.110-12); and Hamlet has, in the end, done right by his murdered father by fulfilling his father's ghost's command to avenge his death-an
act commemorated by Fortinbras in tl1e play's final lines, which announce a ceremony meant to bear witness to Hamlet's essential royalty.
All tl1ese features suggest that literary renderings of tragic occurrences operate under a kind of mandate to disclose the larger, affirmative horizon to which
such occurrences (ostensibly) belong. Wiesel's book, however, forcefully repudiates this mandate: in Night, no characterological flaw or sin is ever described
or invoked as a warrant for what the book's narrator experiences. There is,
moreover, no way to see Jewish suffering or death as heroic or ennobling. And
finally, there is no certainty tl1at what has transpired will be (or is even capable
of being'j suitably rri~morialized. If the autl10rs of Oedipus the King and Oedipus at Colonus, The Inferno , and Hamlet have given us ways to understand and
resolve the suffering and death their works depict, the author of Night has written a book replete instead with moments of interpretive crisis that find no satisfactory resolution. To read Night is, for this reason, to be forced to think critically, since such moments of crisis suspend (and thereby render inadequate) all
the traditional ways we give meaning to our world and to our lives . Indeed, so
many of the traumatic scenes and images in Wiesel's memoir-spare and unadorned in their description-stand implicitly as calls to see the truth or viability of cherished ideas and beliefs as entirely contingent, as dependent on location and circumstance·• and thus without any claim to stand as absolute or
immutable, apart from the catastrophe of history. For me, the sine qua non of
any class devoted to critical thinking is the capacity to see knowledge and belief
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as fundamentally conditioned and thus as capable of crisis. Herein, moreover,
lies the etllical importance of critical thinking, since to see truth and belief as
conditioned for or capable of crisis is to lose tl1e certitude that often motivates
t]1e commission of violence against those who do not share the same truth or
belief. Bereft of such certitude, critical thinkers begin to see that traditional
codes of ethical conduct are not always singular and not always clear.
So that students are ready to see themselves addressed by the difficult scenes
and images of Wiesel's book, I assign (and we discuss) his essay "The Holocaust
as Literary Inspiration" before our consideration of Night. Invoking the Holocaust's "magnitude and its ontological nature," Wiesel suggests that all our ways
of being at home in the world need now to be set against tl1e background of
"tl1at faraway kingdom of darkness." According to Wiesel, "all that can be obtained through knowledge has to be recalled into question ... . [M]an's relationship to his creator, to society, to politics, to literature, to his fellow man and
to himself has to be reexamined" (6). In claims such as these, Wiesel enjoins us
to see critical thinking as one primary, ethical legacy of the Holocaust, to see
tl1e challenge bequeathed to us by it: since virtually every facet of organized society was complicit in the crime (or ineffectual in trying to stop it), every facet
must now be reexamined to prevent its repetition. Wiesel sounds a similar
theme later in his essay when he claims that if we are to understand the Holocaust, we will have to understand "why all the killers were Christians, bad
Christians surely, but Christians" and "why so many killers were intellectuals,
academicians, college professors, lawyers, engineers, physicians, tl1eologians"
(17).

These claims exempt nothing from critical scrutiny, and we talk here about
how Wiesel's remarks bridge the gap between tl1e extreme and the ordinary,
about how our ordinary occupations and belief systems are perhaps always just
a stone's throw from an extreme that we do not see as extreme or as relevant to
us . Thinking about this proximity can get us to recognize how easily our ordinary occupations and belief systems might involve us implicitly in the commission of violence or how our own pursuits might be suddenly halted by the extreme acts of others. Indeed, I try to point out how the very terms ordinary and
extreme already imply a certain perspective or subject position, since during the
Holocaust (and even today) the proximity or conflation of the two were experienced in radically different ways depending on how much power, privilege, and
comfort one enjoyed. I sometimes write the words ordinary and extreme on the
chalkboard and solicit general impressions of what experiential features might
constitute each category. Our reading of the first ten or so stories of Ida Fink's
short story volume Traces helps with this exercise, since the stories are fundamentally concerned with the tlu·eshold-one story in this set is titled "The
Threshold" and the word appears in several others-that separates the ordinary
(e.g., musical concerts, first romantic loves, schooling plans, enjoyment of nature) from the extreme (e.g., terror, violence, separation, loss). Sometimes I depict the categories as columns and write them intentionally as far apart on the
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chalkboard as I can. This setup allows me, when we have finished our data collection, to pose a question about the distance, in our heads, between these two
concepts. At other times I write ordinary and collect its features at the top half
of one board and write extreme and collect its features on the bottom half of the
same board: this format allows us to consider that perhaps the extreme lies beneath the ordinary and is capable, at a moment's notice, of erupting into it. Either way, the stage is thereby set for a discussion of how Wiesel's goal is to ward
off the conflation of the two terms by asking us constantly to remember when
they were indistinguishable. At one point in his essay, Wiesel writes that
"[a]nyone who does not actively, constantly engage in remembering and in
making others remember is an accomplice of the enemy" (16). What this line
shares with all the lines I have so far cited from "The Holocaust as Literary Inspiration" is Wiesel's insistence on the Holocaust's universal implications-his
belief that everyone has a stake in tl1inking about the lasting consequences of
what happened. Elsewhere in the essay, Wiesel suggests that the victims "did
not die alone, for sometlting in all of us died with them" (7) and that although
he sees everything "through that event ... it would be wrong to assume that it
means something only to us Jews" (17).
While I have had students who begin spontaneously to think about tl1e connection between their own ordinary academic disciplines and the commission
of extreme (Nazi) violence, my teaching of Night aims to use the traumatic
scenes to train a critical eye on two of tl1e more general items in Wiesel's list of
things in need of reexamination: traditional religious belief and the faith we
place in our fellow human beings (especially parental figures). Let me begin
with traditional religious belief, because it is the issue tl1at occupies two of the
tluee eighty-minute sessions I give to the book. Here, Wiesel's concern is to
document the corrosive effects of Auschwitz on a young boy's piety-his deteriorating belief in a God endowed with traditional attributes, capable of intervening (on his own or at the behest of prayer) in history. Sometimes I hand out
a simple, twenty-minute writing prompt that reads:
How 'tloes Wiesef change over the course of the first sixty-five pages of
Night? Introduce and discuss two scenes tl1at you see capturing this
change.
At other times I ask questions like, What kind of boy is Wiesel at the beginning
of the book? Why do you suppose Wiesel elected to begin with the figure of
Moishe the Beadle? In eliciting responses to these sorts of questions, I aim to
begin to establish that Wiesel's belief-his daily devotion to prayer and his ardent desire to study the Talmud-is genuine (in anticipation of tl1ose students
who, after Wiesel loses his faith at Auschwitz, will claim that it must not have
been all that strong in tl1e first place). I want also to chart carefully the deterioration of his religious belief, so that we can see Wiesel's eventual loss of faith as
a process, as the outcome of a struggle. On the morning of their deportation,
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Wiesel wakes at dawn because he "wanted to have time to pray before leaving"
(18), and when they arrive at the ghetto, he invokes a prayer tl1at refers to God's
"infinite compassion" (20). At the last stop on the way to Auschwitz, when the
deportees are told that they are being taken to a labor camp, Wiesel reports that
"[we] gave thanks to God" (27). Even after the traumatic first night of
Auschwitz-when Wiesel reacts angrily to his father's recital of the Kaddish,
when he sees the smokestacks, which he states "murdered my God and my
soul" (34), and when he claims tl1at tl1e student of the Talmud whom he had
once been "had been consumed by the flames" (37)-Wiesel still evinces a belief in God's power and the efficacy of prayer. When his new pair of shoes is hidden by mud, he thanks God in an "improvised prayer" (38), and when he hears
men in his barrack lending a religious meaning to their experience, he doubts
not God's existence but his absolute justice (45). Later in the book, he even offers up a prayer "to this God in whom I no longer believed" (91).
A close reading of passages such as these can help deepen a consideration of
later scenes that dramatize Wiesel's disbelief in God's traditional attributes and
the efficacy of prayer. I refer here not just to the death of the pipel (whose body
on the gallows, Wiesel claims, is God incarnate [65]) but also to the scenes that
follow that death, when tl1e other prisoners are able to pray in observance of
Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur (66-69). To tl1ese scenes one might add
Wiesel's portraits of Akiba Drumer and the rabbi "from a small town in Poland"
(76), both of whom remain believers for a long time in Auschwitz but, at the
end, break under the strain. Students are moved by these scenes, and some try
to argue that Wiesel does not lose his religious faith entirely if we take seriously
Moishe the Beadle's claim early in the book that "Man comes closer to God
through the questions he asks Him" (5). There is an interesting discussion to be
had regarding the status of Wiesel's faith, but, ultimately, it ought not to stop us
from asking what is the implication of Wiesel's instances of disbelief for students' own religious beliefs and for religious belief more generally. To pursue
this line of inquiry, I have sometimes collected on the chalkboard a set of religious propositions ordinarily regarded to be absolutely true. These range from
the claim that "All creation bears witness to the greatness of God" to bumper
sticker formulations such as "Never Underestimate the Power of God" or
"Prayer Works! " We end up talking about the extent to which the Holocaust
forces us to qualify or dismiss altogether such maxims. To get at the provisional
nature of truths many regard as eternally self-evident, I ask questions along the
following lines: How are we to regard assettions whose truth appears a function
of the distance between the extreme and the ordinary? Eliminate this distance-as , indeed, it was eliminated for a Jewish boy like Wiesel-and what are
you left with? What would you say about an actual bumper sticker in a death
camp announcing the power of prayer?
The power of Night's ability to catalyze critical thinking about traditional religious belief and the efficacy of prayer exists not only at the level of the narrative but also in the form of the book. I refer here to the inclusion of Franr;ois
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Mauriac's foreword. In this foreword, Mauriac (the Nobel Prize-winning
French Catholic author whose work is consistently occupied with tl1e religious
themes of grace and redemption) recounts his first meeting with Wiesel in
Paris after tl1e war and recalls wanting to provide the Jewish survivor with ilie
redemptive and loving message of the Christian gospel. Mauriac cites tl1e lines
in Night iliat seal Wiesel's absolute estrangement from tl1e God he once adored
and in response writes:
And I, who believe that God is love, what answer was tl1ere to give my
young interlocutor whose dark eyes still held the reflection of tlmt angelic
sadness that had appeared one day on the face of a hanged child? What
did I say to him? Did I speak to him of that otl1er Jew, this crucified
brother who perhaps resembled him and whose cross conquered the
world? Did I explain to him that what had been a stumbling block for his
faitl1 had become ilie cornerstone for mine? And tilat tile connection between tile cross and human suffering remains, in my view, the key to tile
unfatilomable mystery in which the faitil of his childhood was lost? And
yet, Zion has risen up again out of the crematoria and tl1e slaughterhouses. The Jewish nation has been resurrected from among its tilousands of dead. It is they who have given it new life. We do not know tl1e
worili of one single drop of blood, one single tear. All is grace. If tile
Almighty is tl1e Almighty, tile last word for each of us belongs to Him.
That is what I should have said to the Jewish child. But all I could do was
embrace him and weep.
(xxi)
This passage is remarkably powerful and should be read aloud in class. Some
instructors may elect to assign tile foreword as an afterword; my inclination is to
teach it before Night, but either way it works to clarify tile impasse between
Christianity as a progressive (and redemptive) philosophy of history and tile
Holocaust survivor who will reject tile consolations offered by it. Mauriac's peroration is rhetorically complex, and th ere is much to be said not only about his
suggestion .tohat.Israel's-creation means that tile story of tile Jewish people remains a story of progress (a view tl1at may need to be sketched out for students
unfamiliar witil tile history of Israel's creation) but also tile fact tilat Mauriac
cannot say directly to Wiesel what he feels tilat he should have said. Does tl1is
reaction mean tilat when faced in person with someone whose experiences confirm Nietzsche's cry tilat God is dead, a Christian can say nothing? Or does
Mauriac, by publishing the foreword (no doubt witl1 Wiesel's consent), in fact
say tilat tile Holocaust was part of a divine plan, tile necessity of which is bound
up in a grace we cannot fatilom? But if he can say it in print, why cannot he say
it in person? And why did Wiesel allow Mauriac to say it in print when Mauriac
could not say it in person? Does Holocaust testimony turn interfaith encounters
into speechless embraces and restrict religious doctrinal disputes to print?
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The second feature of Wiesel's memoir tilat I take as an occasion for critical
tl1inking is the book's turn from religious belief to what might be called a kind
of humanism-Night's replacement of (as a source of sustenance) the divine fatiler witil tl1e flesh and blood one. Here, I sometimes write on tl1e chalkboard a
line of testimony recorded in Robe1t Kraft's Memory Perceived (a study of tile
F01tunoffVideo Archive at Yale University tilat is a valuable teaching resource,
since it is full of powerful and discussion-catalyzing transcriptions of oral testimony given by Holocaust survivors). The line is uttered by Editil P.: "I don't
pray to God, [she] says, I pray to my fatiler" (130) . Building on tllls idea, many
undergraduate readers will speak of noticing and being drawn to Wiesel's growing reliance on (and intimacy witil) his fatiler as his belief in God wanes. As a
pious boy, Wiesel is not at all close to his fatiler, who is described early on as a
"cultured man, ratiler unsentimental. He[ ... ] was more involved witl1 the welfare of otilers tilan witl1 tilat of his own kin" (4). And yet from tl1e moment tile
Nazis arrive in Sighet, a bond forms between tl1e two of tl1em. This bond becomes most pronounced at Auschwitz, and Night invites readers to believe tilat
the bond between a parent and child in adverse circumstances is unbreakable.
Wiesel's one tl1ought on tl1e ramp at Auschwitz is not to lose his fatl1er (30).
Near the end of tile book, when tile prisoners learn tilat tiley will be evacuated,
Wiesel tl1inks only of not being separated from his fatiler. During tl1e march to
Gleiwitz, tl1e presence of his fatiler is the only thing tilat sustains him (86), and
when they finally arrive at Buchenwald, Wiesel writes, "I tightened my grip on
my fatiler's hand. The old, familiar fear: not to lose him" (104). A case can be
made, however, that tile invitation implicit in such scenes is given only so tl1at
later it can be violently retracted. Students will notice, for instance, how
Wiesel-in tl1e Rabbi Eliahu episode (90-91)-foreshadows his own struggle
witl1 his fatiler (anotiler instance of failed prayer, since Wiesel had prayed never
to become like Rabbi Eliahu's son). And in tl1e scene of his fatiler's deatl1,
Wiesel is forced to confess to feeling a sense of liberation (112).
I elicit tile material I have just discussed by giving anotiler in-class writing
prompt:
What do you see Night saying about fellowship, the human spirit, or
human nature in extreme situations? Introduce and discuss two scenes in
your answer.
As with tile scenes of religious belief, students are moved by the scenes that
reveal the disintegration of Wiesel's regard even for his father, but they must
be pushed a bit to consider the wider implications for our notions of familial
love. Here again, students must reckon with the way a truth's apparent immutability is a function of the distance between the ordinary and the extreme, between, say, nourishment and deprivation. Is a belief in familial
love's inviolability entirely dependent on our own relative comforts? What
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does it mean when a Blockalteste says to Wiesel, "In this place, there is no
such thing as father, brother, friend" (110)? Is the goodness of human nature
in fact something that exists only in environments where basic needs are
being met? Are there environments that put to rest any and all consideration
of a triumphant human spirit? These questions are entertained with more
complexity in Night than might first appear. Students notice, for instance,
the extent to which Wiesel is beset by feelings of guilt and shame even as he
entertains the notion of taking his father's rations. In the end, however,
Wiesel believes himself "[f]ree at last" after his father has died (112). The
book's final image is one that forces us to think critically about what it means
to be human. Bereft of all cherished relationships-with God and with his
father-Wiesel faces the mirror (and our students) as a living corpse. Students thus encounter a person whose very existence stands as a kind of dark
spot on the ideas and beliefs we might want to believe are timeless and transcendent. And because Night's final line leaves us with the clear sense that
Wiesel is still this corpse, there is no way to cement anew an inviolable foundation for such ideas and beliefs-without appearing either to ignore the
textual details of the book or to impose by fiat a meaning the book will not
support. Our foundations shaken, Wiesel thus challenges us to linger with
and concede the Holocaust's irremediable trauma. Getting us to see the contingency of ~any and all values, Night works ethically to create critical
thinkers who are ready to endure the destabilization of their unshakable
truths, who are capable of seeing their cherished ideas and beliefs less as absolute or self-evident truths and more as difficult, opaque, and in some cases
insoluble problems. In their absolute or fixed form, such ideas and beliefs
often animate or sanction the commission of violence, underwriting in the
process an understanding of history and experience as essentially progressive and redemptive. In the form in which Wiesel gets us to consider them,
however, such ideas and beliefs become provisional and plural, requiring debate and dialogue and remembrance of those events in history that cannot
be redeemed. Here, perhaps, is the insuperable value of teaching a book like
Night in a ol:as£-.devoted to critical thinking.

Negotiating the Distance:
Collaborative Learning and Teaching Night
Phyllis Lassner
Night has become a canonical text, not only for Holocaust scholars and university courses on Holocaust representation, but also for many younger readers. As
my undergraduate students at Northwestern University tell me, the ubiquity of
Night on high school reading lists relates to its enduring stature as testimony
and its emotive narrative power as well as to its appeal to teenage readers. This
appeal is based on the assumption that students' own adolescent growing pains
provide an emotional bridge across the void that separates them from the
wrenching psychological and moral experiences faced by young people during
the Holocaust. For this reason , despite their obvious differences in context, experience, and form, Night is often paired with that other iconic Holocaust testimony, The Diary of Anne Frank. Trusting the stability of students' identification and empathy, high school teachers often engage their young readers by
asking how they might react in a similar situation or by having them draw a picture, create an interview, or keep a journal to show their feelings about an incident in the text and to create a pathway of relatedness with the Holocaust character. Such activities represent a pedagogical challenge. For if we agree that
experiences within the Holocaust universe remain inconceivable and unimaginable to those who escaped its claws, then how do we teach testimonies of adolescent experience that defy the possibility of bridging the chasm to relatedness
or identification?
This question has shaped the development of my course Representing the
Holocaust in Literature and Film, where the identities and knowledge base of
the students create another tension. The course is designed as an upper-level
undergraduate seminar; its enrollment limit of sixteen students ensures concentrated time and attention devoted to their individual and collective attempts
to express anxious and exploratory responses to disturbing and disorienting
readings and films. Although Jewish students usually have some Holocaust education through their congregations and trips to various museums and even to
Auschwitz and some students have learned about the Holocaust through other
means , neither they nor the uninitiated are prepared for issues raised by the
testimony of Elie Wiesel, Charlotte Delbo, and Primo Levi and by ongoing
Holocaust criticism: the paradoxical imperatives of silence and filling its void
with testimony, the loss of ethical consciousness to survival instincts, and the
limits of representation. Though these issues remain vexed even for seasoned
scholars, they also provide a template that leads them and students to analyze
and interpret not only Holocaust texts but also their own responses. Daniel
Schwarz's chapter "The Ethics of Reading Elie Wiesel's Night" is a case in
point, where he examines the ethical components of "acknowledging who we

